Abstract. We propose a model of coopetitive-game (of normal-form type) within a perspective of economic growth and devote it to Greek crisis. The model is conceived at a macro level and its main aim is that of rebalancing the current-account of Greece. We construct the game trying to represent feasible scenarios of the strategic interaction between Greece and Germany, which is the strongest economy of the euro area. We shall suggest -after a deep study of our sample -feasible transferable-utility solutions, in a properlycoopetitive perspective, for the divergent interests of Greece and Germany.
Introduction
The main purpose of our contribution is to explore solutions for the Greek crisis, aware of the difficulties affecting the Greek economy. Although Greece has a GDP that reaches only 2% of total GDP of the whole euro area [IMF, 2011] , the Greek crisis is a source of problems for the European economy. Despite the financial aid programs that have been devised to help Greece by the European authorities and IMF, Greece is still in a serious situation for economic and political reasons. In the present chapter we propose an original economic coopetitive model within a perspective of economic growth applied to the Greek crisis, which aims at rebalancing the currentaccount of Greece. This model, based on normal form game theory and conceived at a macro level, aims at suggesting feasible solutions in a coopetitive perspective for the divergent interests, which should drive the economic policies of the countries in the euro area. In the model we consider only two countries: Greece and Germany. So, we propose a model that looks for a win-win solution. A win-win solution is the outcome of a game, which is designed in a way that all participants can profit from it in one way or the other. In our model the win-win solution entails that Germany should contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece, since Germany is the second world's exporter and also needs that the euro area be an economic and financial stable region (Boone, Johnson, 2012) . Indeed, we are aware that this is a mere hypothesis and that our framework of coopetition represents a normative model.
The coopetitive model
In the present model we apply the notion of coopetition, which was devised at micro-economic level for strategic management solutions by Brandenburger and Nalebuff [1995] , who suggest to consider also a cooperative behavior to achieve a win-win outcome for both players. The coopetitive solution provided in our economic model is based on a set of three strategies: two are the classically noncooperative strategies, the third one is a cooperative strategy 1 . For Greece the two variables in our model are investments and exports, since this country must concentrate on them to improve the structure of production and its competitiveness, but also to shift its aggregate demand towards a higher growth path in the medium term [Schilirò, 2012] . Thus Greece should focus on innovative investments, specially investments in knowledge [Schilirò, 2010] , to change and improve its production structure and to increase productivity and, as a result of that, its competitiveness will improve. For Germany, on the other hand, the strategic variables in our model are private consumption and imports. The coopetitive variable (or shared variable) in the model is represented by the export of Greek goods to Germany. So in this situation Germany agrees to purchase a certain amount of goods imported from Greece, this shared variable, decided together by Greece and Germany, becomes the main instrumental variable of the model; consequently Greece will increase its exports by selling more products to Germany. The final result will be that Greece find itself in a better position, but also Germany will get an economic advantage determined by the higher growth in the two countries and, in addition, there will be the important advantage of a greater stability within the euro area. We have already devised a coopetitive model at a macroeconomic level [Carfì, Schilirò, 2011] . In that model [2011] we developed a coopetitive game by excluding the mutual influence of the actions (or strategies) for the two players. This choice has allowed us to greatly simplify the model, secondly it has highlighted the coopetitive aspect, although at the expense of the classical feature of game theory. In the present model, instead, as in another extended model (Carfì, Schilirò, 2012a) , we continue to highlight the coopetitive strategy in its cooperative dimension, represented by the shared variable (identified in the export of Greek goods to Germany), but, in addition, we reintroduce the classical strategic interaction between the two players. This generalization of the model allows us to reach a family of competitive solutions à la Nash from which to choose the win-win solution.
The mathematical model
We propose a coopetitive-game G:=(f,>) (concept introduced in [Carfì, 2009] Strategies in C are chosen, cooperatively, by the two countries.
Strategies
In the model G:
1. we consider an interaction between the two countries also at the level of their non-cooperative strategies; 2. we assume that Greece diminishes its wages and contains its home-consumption.
We assume that: 
Germany Payoff-function
We assume Germany-payoff f1:E 2 ×C→R is its aggregate demand f1=2+C1+I1+X1−M1, where:
1. 2 is the government-spending (constant in our interaction); 2. German private-consumption C1 is the first-projection of S:=E 2 ×C, defined by C1(x,y,z):=x, for any x in E (i.e. German-consumptions are first-components of 3-strategies in S); 3. gross-investment I1 is constant on S and, by translation, supposed equal zero; 4. export X1 is defined by X1(x,y,z)=−y/3, for every possible investment y in innovative-technology (export X1 is a strictly-decreasing reaction-function to Greek investments; 5. import M1 is the third-projection of S, namely M1(x,y,z)=z, for every cooperative-strategy z of C.
Concluding, Germany payoff-function is f1:S→R:f1(x,y,z)=2+x−y/3−z, for every (x,y,z) in S.
Greece Payoff-function
We assume Greece payoff-function is its aggregate-demand f2=2+C2+I2+X2−M2, where:
1. private-consumption function C2, by contract, depends on triples in S and defined by C2(x,y,z):=−2x/3; 2. investment-function I2:S→R is defined by I2(x,y,z):=y+nz, for every (x,y,z) in S; 2 3. export-function X2 is given by X2(x,y,z):=z+my, for every (x,y,z) in S; 3 4. import-function M2 is independent on triples in S, so constant and, by translation, equal zero.
So, Greece reduces its private consumption by 2x/3, for each possible German-consumption x.
Concluding, Greece payoff-function is f2:S→R:f2(x,y,z)=2−2x/3+(1+m)y+(1+n)z, for every (x,y,z) in S.
Payoff-function of G
Coopetitive-game G has payoff-function f:S→R 2 :f(x,y,z)=(2,2)+(x−y/3,−2x/3+(1+m)y)+z(−1,1+n), for every (x,y,z) in S. 1,1+n) . So, we study the initial-game G(0) and we translate any information of G(0), by the vectors v(z), obtaining the corresponding information on G(z). Strategy-square E 2 has vertices (0,0), (3, 0) , (3, 3) , (0,3). We assume m,n non-negative and equal, respectively, to 0 and ½: f(x,y,z)=(2,2)+(x−y/3,−2x/3+y)+z(−1,3/2).
Study of

3.6
Payoff-space of G (0) To determine the payoff-space of the affine-game G(0), we transform the vertices of the strategy-square (G(0) is invertible and its critical zone is empty). The payoff-space boundary of the game G(0) is the parallelogram with vertices f(0,0), f(3,0), f(3,3) and f(0,3) (see fig.1 ). The Nash-equilibrium is the bi-strategy (3, 3) . Indeed, f1 and f2 are affine and increasing in the first and second argument, respectively.
3.7
Payoff-space of G Image of f is union of images im(pz), with z in C: the hexagon with vertices p0(0,0), p0(3,0), p0 (3, 3) and their translations by v(2) (see fig.2 ). Classic bargaining-solutions. The Nash-bargaining solution on f(S), with respect to the infimum of the sup-boundary and the KalaiSmorodinsky (K-S) solution, with respect to the infimum and supremum of sup-boundary, are refused by Germany, they are: TU-better than the Nash-payoff of G(0) but disadvantageous for Germany; rebalancing, but not implementable.
TU-win-win solutions
We obtain win-win solutions by transferable-utility (TU) methods. Indeed, Q′=(2,6) is the point of maximum collective gain on f(S). We propose a rebalancing win-win coopetitive-solution, relative to maximum gain for Greece:
1. let s be the portion of TU-sup-boundary M:=Q′+R(1,−1), contained in the strip determined by the lines P′+Re1 and C′′+Re1, straight lines of Greece Nash-gain in G(0) and of Greece maximum-gain in G, respectively; 2. we consider the K-S segment s′ of vertices B′ -Nash-payoff of the game G(0) -and the supremum (5,6) of the segment s; 3. our rebalancing-compromise is the point K, intersection of segments s and s′, i.e. the solution of the bargaining-problem (s,(B′,sup s)). 
